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Model-driven political science has had some stunning
triumphs in the last few decades. Whether the model is ver-
bally expressed (as in Theda Skocpol’s theory of states and
social revolutions or David Mayhew’s theory of reelection
minded legislators) or mathematically formalized, theoretically-
driven work has added richly to the clarity of many political
science studies and has allowed for aggregation of findings
and studies to help form a more coherent and comprehensive
body of knowledge. While I prefer a combination of historical
and theoretical research to historical inquiry alone, I often find
it helpful to approach research questions by viewing them
partially (never wholly) through a formal lens, often mathemati-
cally.1
There is a rub, though. If there is a weakness in model-
driven political science, and there are many, it lies in the debil-
ity of its “causal mechanics.” To demonstrate this, I select a
reasonably common event in the contemporary world: A politi-
cian gets caught in an extramarital affair or some form of sexual
or romantic indiscretion. Or a statement or action of the politi-
cian is exposed as dishonest. The event is publicized. Voters
(at least in the United States) turn against the politician, and
support for his or her party drops precipitously. At the end of
the day, our scandalous politician loses office (or his or her
allies do).
One common reading from the theoretical literature for
patterns such as this—probably the most common reading—
is that they represent “retrospective voting.” Some unobserved
aspect of the candidate’s “quality” has been revealed to vot-
ers, and now that they are better informed they revise (in some
sort of Bayesian fashion) their beliefs about him, and with
those revisions headed downward, they are less likely to vote
for him in whatever optimum or equilibrium obtains.2
Yet when we think about the mechanics of how we got
from “A” (scandalous politician) to “B” (angry voters), then a
retrospective voting account of this pattern is deeply unsat-
isfying. The idea of causal mechanics is not new, but one
might think of a causal graph with a density of intermediate
nodes that correspond to different “mechanisms” that must
be operative in the process described (perception of a
politician’s action, emotional and rational response, mental
deliberation or conversation with other agents about the ac-
tion, belief/opinion formation, determination to act, action). 3
What actually goes through agents’ heads when they enter
the voting booth to vote against the lying, cheating politi-
cian, or when they participate in some meaningful way against
him? If rationality drives them, do they actually compute utili-
ties (as many of our theorists portray them doing) and com-
pare possible strategies according a maximization (or “best
response”) criterion? Do they truly use Bayes’ rule and con-
ditional probability to update? Or is the data in a voter’s head
much more symbolic and categorical? If voters’ judgments
and attitudes about policies and politicians can be expressed
and measured using “thermometers,” then what is the me-
chanical role of emotions in the revision of beliefs about a
politician?
Our inability to speak clearly to questions such as these
stands as evidence that political science lacks the mechani-
cally compelling portraits of behavior that animate psychol-
ogy, cognitive science, and neuroscience. Part of the problem
lies in our practice of taking problematic concepts and states
of the world and slapping labels upon them (which means we
have not explained them at all). We can describe the wronged
citizen as “loss-averse” or “risk-averse,” but that is an act of
description convenient only for simplifying a model.
Another response to worries such as this is the old argu-
ment that the postulated behavior of a model is “as if” behav-
ior. As long as the voter behaves as if she is punishing the
politician, or as long as she behaves as if she is updating her
beliefs about him in a Bayesian fashion, then all is well with
our explanatory paradigm. The extreme form of this lies in
Milton Friedman’s now tired argument that models and theo-
ries should be judged not at all on the accuracy of their as-
sumptions but on the accuracy of their predictions. Despite
the allure, this is in reality a fundamentally unscientific way of
approaching political reality.
If we admit that questions of causal mechanics such as
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.997345
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this are compelling and need to be addressed fully, then it will
soon become clear that much (not all) quantitative research is
not of much help. At least as it is currently structured, examin-
ing aggregate voting behavior in the wake of a scandal is
likely to tell us little about what goes on in inside the brain. It
will tell us next to nothing about the involvement of emotion.
Neuroimaging research is one promising avenue with which
such questions can be addressed, but even then the success
will be only partial. For one, brain imaging suffers from mas-
sive challenges to external validity—it is difficult if not impos-
sible to create or recreate valid and portable conditions of
politics in the neuroimaging laboratory. For another, and per-
haps more important, the sorts of inferences made in neuro-
imaging place the analysts at several removes from inferences
on the order of “this part of the brain lights up, we conclude
X, that part of the brain lights up, we conclude Y,” as one
neuroimaging specialist explained it to me.4
As heretical as it might sound, I want to suggest that
historical narrative—of the sort practiced by careful histori-
ans and (fewer) careful and historically-oriented political sci-
entists—can assist us in tasks such as these. Suppose I at-
tempt to study the “scandalous politician-angry voter” pat-
tern not by running an experiment or by examining aggregate
vote choice after a particular scandal, but by carefully and
broadly analyzing speech and action in the wake of a scandal
such as Watergate or Teapot Dome.
What sort of data will such an inquiry produce? It might
produce lots of images and symbols that the historical analyst
sees scattered around the culture—a negative advertisement,
a surly photograph, a tearful apology on television, a defiant
denial in print. It might produce lots of text—editorials, letters,
Web-log entries, diaries, news stories, police logs, administra-
tive records—from which I can recover some of the likely con-
tent of voters’ thoughts, emotions, and actions. These sorts of
“data” have all sorts of disadvantages—they are difficult to
compare in an easy statistical manner, speech might misrepre-
sent “true” feelings and intentions, and texts might be subject
to multiple interpretations—but they have advantages that
many of our quantitative data do not. For one, we can see
some part of the content of voters’ thoughts by looking at the
media images or texts (“I did not have sex with that woman,
Miss Lewinsky”; “Read my lips, no new taxes”) that they were
almost certainly processing. For another, we can often ob-
serve emotions and actions taking shape. We can see a person
reasoning through different courses of action, we can observe
(some of) the conversations and deliberations in which new
attitudes, opinions and preferences are formed.
To do this, of course, requires that we recognize the abil-
ity to extract information from symbolic acts and speech acts.
Much of modern political science seems founded upon a skep-
ticism of this sort of move, in part because of underlying con-
cern that “talk is cheap” and preferences are revealed only
through observed costly action. Yet historians and ethnogra-
phers have long stood in recognition of this point and have
nonetheless rendered fascinating contributions from analysis
of texts (diaries) and symbolic complexes (advertisements,
works of pictorial art). The point is this: Even if talk is inten-
tionally misrepresentative, it may be informative. I was intro-
duced to this possibility in reading Harvard historian Walter
Johnson’s wonderful narrative of the New Orleans slave mar-
ket in the 1840s and 1850s (Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Ante-
bellum Slave Market). One of the most enlightening passages
was Johnson’s shrewd elaboration of a sort of methodology
for reading lies (Soul by Soul, 12). One of Johnson’s sources is
a set of court records (regarding contested slave sales) that
have been only recently discovered. Yet Johnson recognizes
that he cannot validly take these texts at face value. Instead of
discarding them (as would most social scientists and histori-
ans), he instead exploits the subtle and embedded information
they contain.
...I have generally read the docket records as if they con-
tain only lies. And yet lies, especially sworn lies given in
support of high-stakes legal action, must be believable in
order to be worth telling: these lies describe the circum-
stances of a specific sale in the terms of a shared account
of what was likely to happen in the slave market.
Johnson follows this point with a rehearsal of the “few stock
stories” that were repeated time and again in court cases. When
traders, owners, and slaves themselves would lie about slaves’
bodies—a slave overstating his weight or understating his
age, an owner assigning virginity to a woman who would be
prized by a buyer for her child-producing potential (or for sexual
domination by the owner)—these lies persisted but tell us
how the process of “commodification” worked. The slave mar-
ket, as Johnson shows, melded the most perfected mecha-
nisms of the capitalist world (the price system, the meeting of
buyer and seller in a differentiated market) with the power sys-
tem of race and domination in Southern society. It converted
“people into prices.” And the evidence that commodification
occurs comes not from a quantitative examination of price, but
from repeated and competing lies told about slaves in court
battles. The idea that a lie has some informational value for the
reader/historian, value that can systematically be appraised,
even with error, was very novel to me. I’m currently writing a
book, and in confronting the ambiguous statements that phar-
maceutical companies, clinical pharmacologists, and FDA regu-
lators told each other over the past half-century, Johnson’s
book—topically a light year’s remove from my project—made
me rethink what I was reading.
There are, finally, patterns of human activity and meaning
that most of our existing models are poorly equipped to make
sense of. Two of these include (1) the persistence of misunder-
standing across individuals and across cultural groupings,
and (2) learning from rare and symbolic events.
A quick look at our own world should convince us of the
relevance of these stable misunderstandings, but driven by
equilibrium analysis, rational choice models are generally poorly
equipped to handle these realities. How do we come to terms
with cultural and political misunderstanding–not just occa-
sional errors of meaning but persistent, decades-long (even
centuries-long) cultural orthogonality of the sort that pre-
vailed in the Great Lakes region of colonial North America
from the mid-1600s to the early days of the American Repub-
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lic? This durable moment in time-space was the venue for the
meeting of dozens of rival and distinct cultures. Some of these
cultures were composed by radically different Native Ameri-
can peoples (the Iroquois and the various nationalities allied
against the so-called “Algonquians” such as the Fox, Kick-
apoo, Ojibwa [Chippewa], and Miami. At least two other cul-
tures were the peculiar settler and imperial cultures that were
spawned by the French and British presence in colonial North
America. In a wonderful book by Stanford historian Richard
White—The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republi-
cans in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815—the limits of
our existing models for explaining centuries-long realities be-
come clear. In a land where no organized entity (no Indian
nation, no Western imperial state outpost) was in complete
control, and where dependence upon the harsh environment
was great for all concerned, the world was governed by a
politics of mutual deference and, importantly, consistent mis-
understanding. These cultural realities did not merely “af-
fect” the fur trade and the French-Algonquian alliance—they
constituted it. The language of alliance was one of “artful
manipulation” (The Middle Ground, 152), and the alliances
were held together by symbols (the calumet, or the atonement
ritual) that were interpreted quite differently by different fac-
ets of the alliance.
Or consider how those who design institutions learn about
them. How did eighteenth-century politicians learn from the
experience of state constitutions with legislative supremacy—
as narrated in Gordon Wood’s magisterial Creation of the
American Republic—and adjust their beliefs to conclude that
strong executive power was necessary in a mixed regime? In
some respects the historical experience under state constitu-
tions in the years 1776-1780 served as “raw data” for later
founders such as John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, and James
Madison. In other respects the data came from “philosophy”—
a reconsideration of the celebrated arguments in favor of ex-
ecutive power in a mixed regime, from Baron de Montesquieu’s
Spirit of the Laws. Yet these “data” were never available nu-
merically to actors of the time and were never “learned” using
rules of conditional probability. The evidence base consisted
instead of rare events, sometimes single events, that were
“observable” only symbolically, and even then were subject
to various interpretations. Wood’s triumph is to draw out a
pattern of learning through observation, deliberation, and po-
litical conflict, a pattern constructed from a wealth of primary
source materials such as pamphlets, editorials, essays, peti-
tions, newspapers, and broadsides.
My sum point is that primary-source-driven narrative and
mathematical modeling can complement one another in ways
that render the status quo—modeling combined only with
statistical estimation alone—a highly impoverished research
agenda.5 In order to realize the possibilities for weaving model
and narrative together, practitioners of each single art will
need to recognize the limits of their own approaches and how
they can be complemented by more imaginative research prac-
tices.
Notes
1 Key for me is that mathematical modeling need not be modeling
that is committed in any way to the rationalist paradigm. Some of the
most fascinating mathematical models are those that explore “bounded
rationality,” network dynamics, stochastic processes, or something
else. The paucity of such non-rational formal models in political
science is a material weakness of our discipline.
2 Alternatively, their vote against the candidate or his party may
comprise some sort of “trigger strategy” or generalized form of pun-
ishment for the politician’s deviation from cooperative or truthful
behavior. For an empirical analysis of one such scandal which shows
that retrospective voting is far more complicated than our current
models would suggest, see Michael A. Dimock and Gary C. Jacobson,
“Checks and Choices: The House Bank Scandal’s Impact on Voters in
1992,” The Journal of Politics 57:4 (November 1995), 1143-59.
3 For discussion of graph-theoretic approaches to causality, see
Judea Pearl, “Causal Diagrams for Empirical Research,” Biometrika
82 (1995), 669-710 (with discussion); Pearl, Causality: Models, Rea-
soning and Inference (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
Steffen L. Lauritzen, Graphical Models (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996).
4 For a wonderful account of how the apparatus of experimenta-
tion can place scientists at further and further remove from the mate-
rial of their inquiry, see Peter Galison, Image and Logic: A Material
Culture of Microphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
5 The most direct attempt to meld narrative and rational-choice
modeling was the Analytic Narratives volume by Bates, Greif, Levi,
Rosenthal, and Weingast. The unfortunate feature of that effort was
its absence of narrative–too many of the narratives were in fact data
analyses, and it was difficult to separate what the authors called
“analytic narrative” from “theory generates comparative statics when
the meet data” exercises with which we are very familiar in modern
political science.
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There’s no doubt about it: multi-method research is in
vogue.1 Perhaps the most obvious evidence of this comes
from the job market. Job candidates who successfully combine
multiple approaches get that ineffable “buzz” and are often
showered with adulation and, ultimately, job offers. As one
faculty friend opined with regard to one particularly excep-
tional candidate, “she is clearly a new kind of comparativist.”
Another remarked that the work was so good, “the talk could
have been delivered in Greek.” Graduate students have taken
these signals to heart. Increasing numbers are attempting to
master qualitative, quantitative, and formal approaches and to
formulate methodologically eclectic research proposals. Yet it
bears noting that the road to the Promised Land isn’t so easy
to navigate. Creatively and effectively combining multiple meth-
ods is time-consuming and difficult, as the article in this news-
letter by current and recent PhD students doing multi-method
research attests (Siegal et al., 2007). It can also be risky. In my
